







David Ricardo has been acclaimed – or vilified – for merits he would never have dreamt of, or 
sins for which he was entirely innocent. Entrenched mythology labels him as a utilitarian 
economist, an enemy of the working class, an impractical theorist, a scientist with ‘no 
philosophy at all’ and the author of a formalist methodological revolution. Exploring a middle 
ground between theory and biography, this book explores the formative intellectual 
encounters of a man who came to economic studies via other experiences, thus bridging the 
gap between the historical Ricardo and the economist’s Ricardo. 
The chapters undertake a thorough analysis of Ricardo’s writings in their context, asking who 
was speaking, what audience was being addressed, with what communicative intentions, 
using what kind of lexicon and communicative conventions, and starting with what shared 
knowledge. The work opens in presenting the different religious communities with which 
Ricardo was in touch. It goes on to describe his education in the leading science of the time – 
geology – before he turned to the study of political economy. Another chapter discusses five 
‘philosophers’ – students of logic, ethics and politics – with whom he was in touch. From 
correspondence, manuscripts and publications, the closing chapters reconstruct, firstly, 
Ricardo’s ideas on scientific method, the limits of the ‘abstract science’ and its application, 
secondly, his ideas on ethics and politics and their impact on strategies for improving the 
condition of the working class. This book sheds new light on Ricardian economics, providing 
an invaluable service to readers of economic methodology, philosophy of economics, the 
history of economic thought, political thought and philosophy. 
 
Sergio Cremaschi is a former Reader of Moral Philosophy at the ‘Amedeo Avogadro’ 
University at Vercelli, Italy. 
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Science, logic, ethics and theology in 
Ricardo’s intellectual biography 
 
 
This book is a contextual reconstruction of an economist’s intellectual biography. 
The purpose is to look where others did not, due to such factors as inapt 
modernisation, proneness to accept received views, constraints created by 
boundaries between disciplines and historiographic mythology. The intent is to 
buy intellectual history, not in bulk but in retail. This implies looking at the co-
text whenever the text is silent and at the context to make sense of what the text 
says or omits to say; it implies screening out what the text may not mean from 
what it may mean, reading utterances going beyond their literal meaning to seek 
out the speaker’s communicative intentions, original audience and knowledge 
shared with that audience. Besides, it implies looking at the history of economic 
thought through spectacles different from the economist’s, at the history of 
political ideas without reducing it programmatically to an appendix of the 
history of economic thought, at the history of ethics as the hotbed where the 
economic theory was sprouting and at the history of religion without secularist 
prejudice. 
Sraffa’s edition is still the starting point. He made an exceptionally meticulous 
job of it, despite not being a historian but rather an economist on loan to history. 
Yet, just like anyone else’s, his personal history and theoretical approach carried 
a pre-comprehension that led to him emphasising some aspects and 
downplaying others. Thus a few chapters in the book try to cover blanks in 
Sraffa’s reconstruction, including examples such as the story of the Italian liberal 
rabbi who, even before Ricardo was born, attempted to give a new start to 
London’s Sephardic community; women intellectuals in the Delvalle-Ricardo 
family; the birth of the new magmatic science of geology; Unitarianism with its 
rationalist and socially committed message; and Ricardo’s philosophical reading.   
The reading of sources may be richer now than it was for our predecessors, but 
the merit is not ours. We are people of average stature standing precariously on 
the shoulders of giants. Dangerous though it may be for both our stability and 
the giants’ backbones, coming after Schumpeter, Sraffa and Hollander gives us a 
broader perspective than any giant or person of above-average height could ever 
imagine. The attempt to detect real-world influences, sources, addressees and 
opponents may emancipate us from mental slavery to long-dead polemicists. 
xii Preface 
It will certainly help to avoid mythological reconstructions such as Halévy’s Benthamite 
Ricardo, Stigler’s unphilosophical Ricardo and Hutchison’s Millian Ricardo. A century 
ago, under the sway of watered-down Hegelianism, intellectual historians used to 
believe that their work was done once they had detected one idea formulated by an 
author in another before him. It was a search for causes instead of reasons, or the 
construction of Biblical genealogies, like Bentham begot Mill and Mill begot Ricardo, 
Descartes begot the Physiocrats and the Physiocrats begot Ricardo or – proceeding in 
the opposite direction – the neoclassical begot modern economic science and Ricardo 
must have carried the genes of neoclassical theory. Intellectual history is not a quest 
for cause-effect relationships and Michelangelo’s Giudizio Universale was no more an 
effect of the counter-Reformation than was Ricardo’s economic theory an effect of the 
Industrial Revolution. 
Besides, intellectual historians may dream that an author was influenced by another 
one merely because he was later raised to greater fame while being comparatively 
unknown at the time under discussion. Sometimes they read an implicit quote into a 
text because they forget that the same word has a different meaning in a different 
context. They may read documents in translation and forget that one word’s shades of 
meaning in their own language are irrelevant when it stands for a Latin, Greek or 
Hebrew word. More often they may read documents in eighteenth-century English and 
take it for granted that words had the same shades of meaning or showed up in the 
same contexts as now. On other occasions, they may strive to stretch meanings of 
sentences to fit everything an author wrote to a system they assume he had in mind 
because they are prey to the myth of coherence: that whatever an author says reveals 
a system of ideas hidden in his mind. They often tend to read what an author said as 
being addressed to us with the intention of informing us of facts. However, when 
Ricardo complained about his neglected education to Mill, he was not informing us but 
expressing respect for Mill’s education at a prestigious university and regret for having 
been excluded from such an opportunity himself. When he told Mary Edgeworth that 
he had been sent to Amsterdam to learn Dutch, French and Spanish but had hardly 
learnt anything he was not informing us, he was shielding himself from an Anglo-Irish 
aristocrat’s prying curiosity vis-à-vis such an exotic bird as a Jew. 
There are multiple reasons for the existence of opposing interpretations and 
misinterpretations in Ricardo scholarship. One is the comparative scarcity of 
documents, another is reticence by primary sources caused by a desire not to fuel 
English-chauvinist prejudice vis-à-vis a ‘migrant’, and a third one is the ballast of past 
attacks or hagiography. Layers of interpretations encrusted in the text may have done 
the rest, and the tendency to read sources naively and overlook contexts gives the coup 
de grace. Stories of ‘influences’ by Descartes, the Physiocrats, Bentham, Mill and – as if 
it were not enough – Dugald Stewart are part of the story together with the specular 




More than giving wrong answers, speculations about Ricardo’s true philosophy, or lack 
of philosophy, answer the wrong kind of questions. The relationship between Ricardian 
economics and his intellectual outlook should be interpreted neither as the opposition 
of science to philosophy (Schumpeter, Hutchison and Stigler) nor as the dependence of 
science on one philosophy (Halévy). This relationship developed as a process through 
which distinct intellectual experiences equipped Ricardo with suggestions whereby he 
selected what he deemed useful to clarify his positive work or defend it from criticism. 
The owl of Minerva, as birdwatchers know, comes out at dusk. There was no Ricardian 
logic in 1811 to inspire his search for ‘principles’ that – as he wrote to Malthus on 17 
April 1815 – could account ‘for all the phenomena in an easy, natural manner’ without 
getting lost in a ‘labyrinth of difficulties’ (Works 6, p. 214). Instead of schooling in one 
philosophy, Ricardo’s equipment with logical, linguistic, epistemological, ethical and 
political ideas came from intellectual do-it-yourself. In order to respond to critics’ 
objections he used material from several sources, a use that was not naive eclecticism 
but a search for arguments to fight what he felt to be delusory or ill-defined entities. 
His weapons came from an arsenal incompatible with epistemological realism, 
Cartesian rationalism or common-sense realism but bearing family resemblances with 
the Geological Society’s legacy, Priestley and Belsham’s epistemology and the post-
scepticism of Adam Smith. 
The author conducted part of the work during a stay at Nuffield College, Oxford in 2013, 
which was made possible by a Jemolo Fellowship. He is grateful to the Bodleian Library, 
the British Library, Harry Manchester College Library, the Fondazione Einaudi, Turin, 
and Milan Catholic University and State University libraries. He presented the first draft 
of a chapter at the 1999 ESHET Meeting in Valencia, others at the Conference of the 
International Society for Utilitarian Studies, Lisbon, 2003, the 2014 STOREP 
Conference in Bergamo, the 2018 ESHET Conference in Madrid, the International 
Conference on Economic Philosophy, Lyon, 2018, the 2018 STOREP Conference in 
Piacenza, the 2019 STOREP in Genova, the Conference on James Mill and John Stuart 
Mill/Classical Political Economy, Kyoto, 2019. The author is grateful to the discussants 
at these conferences, Nathalie Sigot, Andrea Salanti, Ghislain Deleplace, Yuji Sato. The 
author is also grateful to Maria Luisa Pesante, Salim Rashid, Antony Waterman, Arnold 
Heertje, Gilbert Faccarello, Heinz Kurz, Neri Salvadori, Richard Allen, Wilfried Parys, 
Emanuele Levi Mortera and Ryan Walter for sparing him mistakes. Finally, two friends 
played an essential role in the birth of this book: Marcelo Dascal, who worked with the 
present author on the controversy between Malthus and Ricardo, and Pier Luigi Porta, 
who introduced him to Ricardo scholarship. Daphne Hughes has patiently eliminated 
from this book misprints, spelling mistakes and English usage infelicities. All that is left, 
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1. Ricardo’s Sepharad 
This chapter examines the first 21 years of his life, when he was a child in a London 
Sephardi household and, from the age of 13, a member of the Bevis Marks congregation. 
Given the scarcity of primary sources, the chapter adds something to the accounts 
available. First, it contends that we may learn something more about Ricardo’s 
formative years and his religious and moral education than Sraffa and other 
biographers felt able to do with the scant documents available. Second, it contends that 
Ricardo’s Sephardi background is essential to account for his moral and political 
commitments, particularly his ideas on toleration, and to understand the intellectual 
experiences he had and the motivations he acquired. 
The chapter tries to perform a ‘thick’ reading of reticent utterances by Ricardo and 
other sources in the light of their co-text and context. The chapter interprets what they 
meant, whom they were addressing and what they wanted not to disclose to their 
audience. It conducts such thick reading by summarising first the problems with 
interpretation of sources on Ricardo’s biography, secondly illustrating the history of 
the London Sephardi community until Ricardo’s time, and finally reconstructing the 
context of Ricardo’s education. 
Keywords 
Religion; Anglo-Judaism; Jewish Education and Schools; Spanish Language; Amsterdam 
 
2. Ricardo’s encounter with the Quakers 
This chapter illustrates what English Quakerism was at the end of the eighteenth 
century and the moral and intellectual assets this vibrating community granted its 
members and ventures into conjectures about the kind of contacts he may have had 
with Quaker milieus. 
It illustrates the circumstances of Ricardo’s marriage with a Quaker and the ensuing 
break with his religious community that left him in a religious no man’s land. The 
chapter suggests that he became for a time a fellow traveller of Quakerism, and how 
this was not an exceptional event in his time and place, when a significant percentage 
of the Sephardi youngest generation, including a few among Ricardo siblings, severed 
ties with their community primarily through mixed marriage. 
It argues that his acquaintance with Quakerism had, arguably, some role in shaping his 
political commitments and his views on toleration and philanthropic enterprises. The 
chapter adds evidence to the effect that his Quaker acquaintances had a role in shaping 
his intellectual interests, particularly encouraging him in the study of some areas of 
natural science, namely geology, mineralogy and chemistry. 
Keywords 





Ricardo’s encounter with the Unitarians 
This chapter collects overlooked evidence concerning Ricardo’s adhesion to 
Unitarianism, showing how this was not an isolated event but part of a flux of 
adhesions, after a conflict between traditionalist and liberals, by Quakers who felt that 
Unitarianism was the closest approximation to the original Quaker spirit. Then the 
chapter examines elucubrations on Ricardo’s Atheism, proving that no evidence 
whatsoever exists in their favour. The chapter concludes that there is no proof that 
Ricardo was either an agnostic or an atheist. The facts are that he was just a Sephardi 
convert like others; he converted to Unitarianism, which implied a less traumatic break 
with his origins than adhesion to the established Church; and he adhered to what 
looked then as the only available organised form of ‘rational belief’. 
Keywords 
Religion; Unitarianism; Theology; Theodicy; Toleration; Philanthropy; Science 
 
4. Ricardo’s encounter with geologists  
This chapter revises available biographical evidence about Ricardo’s family and the 
kind of education he received. Evidence concerning Ricardo’s early interest in the 
natural sciences, considered by Sraffa to have had a more profound impact on Ricardo’s 
mind than Benthamite philosophy, is collected and interpreted. It discusses the 
circumstance that geology was the most innovative science of the time because of its 
recent discoveries and their impact on religious issues such as the Creation of the world 
and the Bible’s trustworthiness. It reconstructs the contents of a book for boys on 
mineralogy by one of Ricardo’s cousins. It lists Ricardo’s contacts at the Geological 
Society and ideas on scientific method circulating among geologists. It ends with the 
suggestion that, when historians of economic thought have believed it proper to try to 
take a trans-disciplinary look at the history of economic science, they have bought the 
history of science wholesale and drawn comparisons between Newtonian Astronomy 
and classical political economy. However, both political economy and geology date 
their origins at about the same time. Ricardo’s contacts are reconstructed, including 
Francis Horner, whom he first met at the Geological Society and was the first source of 
encouragement to write on economic subjects. 
Keywords 
Chemistry; Mineralogy; Geology; British Scientific Societies; Geology and Theological 
Controversy; Geology and the Scientific Method 
 
5. Ricardo’s encounter with philosophers and political economists 
This chapter discusses intellectual partnerships Ricardo established from the time he 
started cultivating economic studies. It discusses Ricardo’s meeting with Francis 
Horner at the Geological Society and its impact on the beginning of his career in political 
economy. It discusses the relationship with Belsham and argues possible familiarity on 
Ricardo’s side with topics from the Hartley-Priestley philosophy in language, 
epistemology, ethics and politics. It reconstructs the origins of the myth of Ricardo’s 
dependence on Bentham through Mill, examines their shared political commitments 
and reconstructs Ricardo’s increasingly critical attitude to Mill in ethics and politics and 
his master-to-pupil attitude to Mill in economic subjects. Then it offers an overview of 
the controversy with Malthus, highlighting the strong effects it had on Ricardo’s line of 
enquiry. A similar overview is offered of the correspondence with Say, highlighting 
some influence exerted by Say in a first phase and the deadlock into which the 
correspondence was trapped because of mutual misunderstanding on the topic of 
utility and value. 
Keywords 
Newtonianism; Scottish Philosophy; Hartley-Priestley Philosophy; Benthamite 
Philosophy 
6. Ricardo on logic and political economy  
This chapter illustrates how Ricardo’s ‘cast of mind’ resulted from several influences 
absorbed at distinct phases in his intellectual evolution. In logic and epistemology, he 
owed virtually nothing to Bentham and Mill. He may have learnt philosophical ideas 
from discussions about Geology, as reflected in Kirwan’s Elements, for example, the 
importance of precise terminology, constant need to correct gross indications of 
unassisted senses and the need to try to attain the same precision as that of algebraic 
formulas. He may have picked up other ideas from Belsham on language and method: 
the desirability of explicit definitions, the need to keep the complexity of causal 
interactions in mind, the need to stick to mono-causal explanations. He may have learnt 
from Horner that we should avoid the practical men’s hasty generalisations and 
distinguish between limited experience and transitory effects, on the one hand, and 
permanent regularities, on the other. 
He shared with Malthus the ‘Newtonian’ lesson, a generally accepted view of science as 
the art of establishing principles from qualified observation, a basis made of universal 
facts as contrasted with apparent or transitory phenomena, which Ricardo calls 
‘permanent causes’. He differed from Malthus in emphasising the limits to human 
knowledge, in mistrusting causal explanations and restricting science to ‘general laws’. 
Keywords 




7.   Ricardo on ethics and political economy 
Ricardo was not a utilitarian. He was instead a critic of utility, consequentialism, self-
interest. His ethics was based on good readings, including Bayle, Montesquieu, Adam 
Smith and Paley. He had it clear that there are universal moral principles neither 
dependent on positive religion nor derived from the felicific calculus, ‘moral 
impressions’ are the first source of moral judgement, the rational search of happiness 
is the ‘rule of life’ whose beneficence is a crucial part. 
He assumed that human nature is complex, not governed only by pain and pleasure but 
also by imagination and desire for sympathy. He was aware that happiness is a complex 
and unstable condition, and the mirroring relationship between individuals plays an 
important role. 
He endorsed unlimited toleration, believed that good government is secured by 
representative institutions and a system of checks and balances that makes the interest 
of those in power coincide with those of the citizens. 
He believed that the science of political economy highlights the general laws regulating 
the economy. The legislator is free to pursue ends dictated by a sense of justice within 
the bounds of what is possible. Removing legislation and institutions distorting the 
market would strengthen the labourers’ bargaining power. 
Ricardo believed that theodicy is a question without an answer. His cautious attitude 
vis-à-vis the social question depends on an awareness of the limits to human 
knowledge. He sided with the poor but with caution dictated by awareness of the 
additional misery any significant change unavoidably carries. 
Keywords 
Ethical Theory; Happiness; Natural Morality; Utilitarianism; Religion and Morality; 
Limited Scepticism; Theology; Theodicy; Toleration; Just War; Social Justice  
